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NOTES
THE AVAILABILITY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AS A NECESSARY
COST OF RESPONSE IN PRIVATE COST-RECOVERY ACTIONS
UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 1 Its purpose was
to remedy the environmental problems caused by abandoned hazardous
waste sites.2 Prior to 1980, hazardous waste3 had been regulated primarily
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 4 and, to a
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
2. HR. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20; see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454,
1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 126 CONG. REC. 31,964 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio))
("[CERCLA's] purpose was to ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste disposal
sites, and to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances bore the cost of reme-
dying the conditions they created.").
3. CERCLA defines a "hazardous substance" as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under
or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921]
(but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal
Act [42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant
listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and (F) any immi-
nently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Adminis-
trator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] has taken action pursuant to section
2606 of title 15.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). Section 9602 further classifies as hazardous substances "such
elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the en-
vironment may present substantial danger to the public health, welfare or the environ-
ment .... " Id. § 9602(a).
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). Congress enacted RCRA to rem-
edy the problems associated with inadequate and environmentally unsound methods of solid
and hazardous waste disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988). The specific provisions pertain-
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lesser extent, by the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA").5 These
statutes focused on the prevention of hazardous waste problems.6 Conse-
quently, they proved inadequate to deal with the increasing threats posed
by existing hazardous waste sites.' Congress drafted CERCLA to fill in
the gap left by prior legislation."
To ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of hazardous waste sites,
ing to hazardous waste management are included in chapter 82 subchapter I of Title 42 of
the United States Code. Id. §§ 6921-6939b. RCRA addresses the problem of hazardous
waste from the time of their creation until disposal by providing standards applicable to:
generators of hazardous waste, id. § 6922; transporters of hazardous waste, id. § 6923; and
owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, id. §
6924. These sections also give the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") the power to promulgate further standards. Id. §§ 6922-24.
5. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codi-
fied generally as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988)). Congress enacted TSCA for
the purpose of regulating chemical substances and mixtures that subject individuals and the
environment to unreasonable risks of injury. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988). Specifically, TSCA
requires the testing of certain chemical substances and mixtures, id. § 2603; requires pre-
manufacturing and processing notices for new substances or new uses for old substances, id.
§ 2604; and provides regulations pertaining to hazardous substances and mixtures, id. §
2605. In addition, TSCA provides the Administrator of the EPA with the authority to take
civil action against the responsible parties when chemical substances and mixtures present
imminent hazards. Id. § 2606.
6. See id. § 2601; 42 U.S.C. § 6902. RCRA does contain some provision pertaining to
existing hazardous waste sites. Section 6945 states that existing sites are subject to measures
promulgated by the Administrator of the EPA to "eliminate health hazards and minimize
potential health hazards." 42 U.S.C. § 6945 (1988). This provision does not give the Admin-
istrator the authority to enforce the law through litigation. However, section 6973 does give
the Administrator the authority to bring suit against a wrongdoer if the site presents an
imminent and substantial danger to health or the environment. Id. § 6973 (1991). This stan-
dard is often difficult to meet. See Joseph K. Brenner, Note, Liability for Generators of
Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047,
1055 n.50 (1981).
7. The House Report described the problem in the following manner:
Over the past two decades, the Congress has enacted strong environmental legislation
in recognition of the danger to human health and the environment posed by a host of
environmental pollutants. This field of environmental legislation has expanded to ad-
dress newly discovered sources of such danger as the frontiers of medical and scien-
tific knowledge have been broadened.
After having previously focused on air and water pollutants, the Congress, in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, provided a prospective cradle-to-
grave regulatory regime governing the movement of hazardous waste in our society.
Since enactment of that law, a major new source of environmental concern has sur-
faced: the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous
waste disposal practices known as the "inactive hazardous waste site problem." The
unfortunate human health and environmental consequence of these practices has re-
ceived national attention amidst growing public and Congressional concern over the
magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course of response that should be pur-
sued. Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem.
H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120.
8. See id. at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119-20.
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CERCLA provides the government with various avenues of enforcement
and recovery. The government may issue an administrative order compel-
ling private parties to clean up a site,9 or it may undertake cleanup efforts
itself.10 When the government elects the latter option, it finances the
cleanup using money from the Hazardous Substance Trust Fund
("Superfund").' After the cleanup, the government may bring an action
against the responsible parties to recover money it expended and to re-
plenish the Superfund. 2 CERCLA's list of potentially responsible parties
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). The President may issue administrative orders compelling
cleanup when he determines that there may be an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare, or to the environment because of an actual or threatened release of
a hazardous substance from a facility. Id. The term "release" means "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment ... ." Id. § 9601(22). The term "facility" means:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft,
or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any con-
sumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id. § 9601(9). By Executive Order, the President delegated the majority of his presidential
authority under CERCLA to the Administrator of the EPA. Exec. Order No. 12580, 3 C.F.R.
193 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988). § 300.2 (1986).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). Section 9604(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released [into the environment] or there is
a substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (1) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or wel-
fare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan,
to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to
such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its re-
moval from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure
consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to
protect the public health or welfare or the environment. When the President deter-
mines that such action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or operator
of the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party, the President may allow
such person to carry out the action, conduct the remedial investigation, or conduct
the feasibility study in accordance with section 9622 of this title.
Id. § 9604(a)(1).
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). The "Superfund," also known as the Hazardous Sub-
stance Trust Fund, is an 8.5 billion dollar fund created to finance the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 54 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836. Title forty-two, section 9611 of the United States Code specifies
the purposes for which Superfund money may be used. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). One such
purpose is the payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to section 9604.
Id. § 9611(a)(1).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(b), 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). Section 9604(b) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the President is authorized to act pursuant to subsection(a) of this section
[when a hazardous substance presents, an imminent and substantial danger] ... [he]
may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and
other studies or investigations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to plan and
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includes past and present owners and operators of a site, as well as any
generators and transporters who contributed hazardous substances to the
site.' 3 CERCLA holds these individuals strictly liable for the ensuing en-
vironmental damage"4 and allows them only a limited number of
defenses.' 5
direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of
this chapter.
Id. § 9604(b) (emphasis added).
Section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows the government to recover all costs of removal or remedial
action that were incurred not inconsistent with the national contingency plan. Id. §
9607(a)(4)(A). See infra note 13 for text of section 9607(a). The national contingency plan
("NCP") establishes procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous sub-
stances and contaminants. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). It is codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300
(1985). For cases involving government cost recovery actions see, e.g., United States v.
Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615
(D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo.
1984).
13. Section 9607 is CERCLA's liability provision. Subsection (a) subjects the following
parties to liability for response costs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or en-
tity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or en-
tity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs...
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
Another group of individuals increasingly being held liable as responsible parties includes
corporate officers who supervised waste disposal operations with knowledge of waste compo-
sition and its ultimate destination. See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32 (D.
Vt. 1988) (finding that managing shareholders of a mercury thermometer plant were liable
for a release of mercury from the plant); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (classifying a vice-president and major
stockholder of a manufacturing plant as an owner/operator due to his ability to control the
disposal of hazardous wastes, and therefore holding his liable for releases of hazardous
waste).
14. Section 9601(32) provides that the standard of liability under CERCLA should be the
same as that under section 1321 of Title 33. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). Courts have con-
sistently construed these sections as mandating strict liability. See Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 843-844; City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
15. Persons otherwise liable may be absolved from liability only if damage was caused
solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b) (1988). The defendant can be absolved of liability by an act of a third party only if
that third party is someone other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or is someone
[Vol. 26:213
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CERCLA also provides nongovernmental entities with options for en-
forcement and recovery. It allows private parties to undertake cleanup
activities and recoup their expenses from the Superfund. 6 In addition,
CERCLA states that any person who has incurred necessary costs of re-
sponse, consistent with the national contingency plan," may bring an ac-
tion to recover these costs from responsible parties.'8 This Note focuses
upon the latter alternative. Although the private cause of action is widely
recognized, 19 courts have failed to delineate exactly what expenditures
constitute necessary costs of response. In particular, federal courts have
divided sharply over the issue of whether CERCLA permits a private
party to recover attorneys' fees as a necessary cost of response.' 0
in a contractual relationship with the defendant, and only if the defendant exercised due
care and "took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and
the consequences that could foreseeably result. . . ." Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1988). Section 9611(a)(2) authorizes the use of Superfund
money for the "[p]ayment of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by any other
person [other than the government] as a result of carrying out the national contingency plan
• " as long as such costs were approved under the plan and certified by the responsible
federal official. Id. See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 195-96 (1986);
Kenneth J. Bulko, Comment, Private Right of Action to Recover Cleanup Costs from
Superfund, 49 ALB. L. REv. 616 (1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). The national contingency plan is a plan prepared and pub-
lished by the President which establishes "procedures and standards for responding to re-
leases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants." Id. § 9605(a); see 40 C.F.R.
300.1 et seq. (1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). CERCLA defines "person" to include "an individ-
ual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State,
or any interstate body." Id. § 9601(21).
19. The first case to hold that private parties may recover the costs of hazardous sub-
stance cleanup from responsible parties was City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The court permitted the city to recover its response costs
from various companies that had been illegally dumping hazardous substances at the city's
landfill. Id.
20. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that CERCLA allows a private party to recover attorneys' fees "incurred in bringing a
cost recovery action"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759
F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by private party
in litigating CERCLA claim recoverable); Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998
(D. Minn. 1991) (holding that CERCLA authorizes recovery by private parties of attorneys'
fees and expenses); Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal.
1990) (holding that recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant to CERCLA is consistent with Con-
gressional intent); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
attorneys' fees are recoverable by private parties for proper response activities); Bulk Dis-
trib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that a private
litigant may recover costs of response once cleanup action has begun). But see United States
v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (holding that attorneys' fees and costs of
litigation not recoverable by private litigant under CERCLA); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739
F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H. 1990) (dismissing a private claim for attorneys' fees under CERCLA);
Fallowfield v. Strunk, No. 89 Civ. 8644 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (holding that recovery by
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This Note explores the issue of whether private parties may recover
attorneys' fees in cost-recovery actions. The resolution of this issue would
further Congress' goal of accomplishing the prompt, effective cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. It would eliminate much time-consuming and ex-
pensive litigation and would enable private parties to assess, in advance
of cleanup, the economic feasibility of undertaking response measures.
This Note begins by defining the phrase "costs of response."2 It briefly
highlights the "American Rule" regarding the recovery of attorneys' fees22
and examines the government cost-recovery action.2 3 Next, it compares
the cost-recovery provisions applicable to the government with those ap-
plicable to private parties24 and analyzes the issue of whether attorneys'
fees are available to private parties as a cost of enforcement.2 5 This Note
discusses a strict interpretation of the SARA amendments26 and con-
cludes with a forecast of the future of private cost-recovery actions.
27
II. DEFINING "COSTS OF RESPONSE"
CERCLA does not define the phrase "costs of response." It does, how-
ever, define the term "response" to include removal and remedial ac-
tions.2s As one court explained, "'removal' actions are primarily those in-
tended for the short-term abatement of toxic waste hazards, while
'remedial' actions are typically those intended to restore long-term envi-
ronmental quality. '29
CERCLA defines "removal actions" as those actions necessary to clean
up or remove hazardous substances from the environment; to monitor,
assess and evaluate the release of hazardous substances; to dispose of re-
moved material; and to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the
private individuals of attorneys' fees is not consistent with congressional intent); Regan v.
Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1989) (stating that Congress did not intend to allow
citizens seeking response costs to recover attorneys' fees); BCW Assoc., Ltd. v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 5947 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1988) (awarding attorneys' fees incurred
to respond to threatened relapse, but declined to award attorneys' fees for litigation); T & E
Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that a private party
had no right to recover attorneys' fees when bringing an action to recover response costs).
21. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 91-122 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). The terms "respond" and "response" mean remove, re-
moval, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including "removal" and "remedial ac-
tion") include enforcement activities related thereto. Id.
29. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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public health or welfare, or to the environment.3" This broad definition
encompasses such activities as constructing security fences or other mea-
sures to limit access to a hazardous waste site, providing alternative water
supplies, evacuating and housing individuals threatened by exposure to
the hazardous substances, and other emergency measures. 31
CERCLA defines "remedial actions" as those actions consistent with a
permanent remedy that are taken instead of, or in addition to, removal
actions in order to prevent endangering the public health or welfare, or
the environment. 2 Examples include storage, confinement, perimeter
protection, neutralization, recycling, and diversion.33 Presumably, since
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). That section provides in full:
[R]emove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous sub-
stances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary [sic] taken in the
event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to
the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a
release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to,
security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water sup-
plies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise pro-
vided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assis-
tance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act [42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.].
Id. (footnote omitted).
31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988). That section provides:
"[R]emedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with permanent
remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or mini-
mize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause sub-
stantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The
term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as
storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay
cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated con-
taminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive
wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collec-
tion of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative
water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions
protect the public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the
costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities
where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures,
such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazard-
ous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare;
the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or se-
cure disposition of hazardous substances
and associated contaminated materials.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
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the term "response" includes removal or remedial actions, "costs of re-
sponse" are costs associated with removal and remedial actions such as
those listed above.3 4
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES AS A COST OF RESPONSE
A. The American Rule
To ascertain whether private parties may recover attorneys' fees as a
cost of response under CERCLA, it is necessary first to review the
"American Rule" regarding the recovery of attorneys' fees in general.3 5
This rule prescribes that a prevailing litigant ordinarily is not entitled to
collect reasonable attorneys' fees from the losing party absent explicit leg-
islative authorization. 6 A statute must provide more than a generalized
command authorizing the recovery of attorneys' fees before a successful
party may actually recover those fees.3
The American Rule would seem to bar the recovery of attorneys' fees in
cost-recovery actions because CERCLA does not specifically state that
prevailing parties may recover these costs. 8 Nevertheless, federal courts
have uniformly allowed the government to recover its attorneys' fees in
cost-recovery actions taken pursuant to CERCLA.3 9 Some courts have
even extended this right to private parties.4" The opinions in these latter
cases suggest two reasons why courts have allowed the private recovery of
34. Courts have permitted litigants to recover a variety of expenses under the heading
"costs of response." Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986) (allowing the recovery of investigatory and testing expenses); New York v. Shore Re-
alty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing the recovery of the costs of site
assessment and supervisory expenses); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D.
Tenn. 1988) (allowing the recovery of the costs of studies, investigation, soil testing, and
water monitoring); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 851-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (allowing the recovery of ... litigation costs, attorneys'
fees, salaries and expenses associated with monitoring, assessing and evaluating releases and
taking ameliorative action).
35. Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co, 757 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (D. Minn. 1991) (stating that
"[w]henever it is faced with a request for attorneys' fees, a court must start with the 'Ameri-
can Rule' ").
36. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The "Ameri-
can Rule" is distinguished from the "English Rule," wherein counsel fees are regularly
awarded to the prevailing party. Id. (footnote omitted).
37. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976).
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(b), 9607(a)(4)(A), (B)(1988).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990);
United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 630-31 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (D.S.C. 1984); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, at 850 (W.D. Mo.
1984).
40. See supra note 20.
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attorneys' fees despite the absence of explicit congressional authorization.
Some courts have concluded that CERCLA authorizes such recovery with
the degree of explicitness sufficient to satisfy the American Rule.4 ' Other
courts have argued that the haste with which Congress drafted CERCLA
accounts for many oversights in its provisions.42 This fact may have led
many courts to construe CERCLA's provisions liberally in borderline
cases.
43
B. Government Cost-Recovery Actions
The government's right to recover its attorneys' fees in cost-recovery
actions is well established.4 4 Courts have construed sections 9604(a),
9604(b) and 9607(a) (4) (A) of CERCLA as collectively authorizing the
award of attorneys' fees to the government.
4
Section 9604(a) allows the President to take action whenever there is
an actual or threatened release of any hazardous substance, or of any pol-
lutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare.4 Specifically, the President may
take whatever removal or remedial action is necessary to protect the pub-
lic health or welfare, unless he determines that a responsible party could
properly handle such an action.4 7
41. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990); Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998, at 1006 (D. Minn. 1991).
42. In Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir.
1988), the court remarked: "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been
criticized frequently for unartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its pre-
cipitous passage. Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately
defined terms, a difficulty particularly apparent in the response costs area." Id. at 648; see
also Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) ("[T]here are a
myriad of issues that are not expressly resolved by the statute, which has been criticized for
failing to provide a satisfactory definition of response costs."); Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v.
Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("Problems of interpretation have
arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms. . . ."); Fallowfield v. Strunk, No.
89 Civ. 8644, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) ("Few would maintain that CERCLA is a
model of legislative draftsmanship .... "); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (describing CERCLA as "a severely diminished piece of
compromise legislation from which a number of significant features were deleted").
43. Some courts have advocated a general rule for construing CERCLA liberally: "CER-
CLA is essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public
health and the environment. . . . Its provisions therefore should [be] construed . . . liber-
ally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes." Pease & Curren, 744 F.
Supp. at 951 (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farm Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (alteration in original)).
44. Id. at 950 ("It is well established that the federal government can recover its attor-
ney's fees pursuant to CERCLA.").
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 10.
47. Id.
1991] CERCLA
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Section 9604(b) provides that whenever the President is authorized to
act pursuant to section 9604(a), he may undertake such legal studies and
investigations as he deems necessary to plan and direct response actions,
and then may recover the costs thereof.48
Section 9607(a)(4)(A) confirms the government's right to recover these
legal costs. It holds responsible parties liable for all costs of removal or
remedial action that the government incurs not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan.49 The definition of "removal" includes action
taken pursuant to section 9604(b).11
The case which began the precedent of allowing the government to re-
cover its attorneys' fees in cost-recovery actions was United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO).5" In that
case, the United States brought an action against a chemical manufac-
turer, a transporter of chemical waste products, and others to recover the
costs it had incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site.52 The chemi-
cal company, a manufacturer of hexachlorophene, had buried a large
quantity of toxic by-products on a farm near its plant.53 The court held
the defendants jointly and severally liable for all response costs, including
attorneys' fees. 5 4
The NEPACCO court prefaced its decision by reciting the American
Rule that a prevailing party cannot recover its attorneys' fees unless a
contract or statute explicitly authorizes such an award. The court then
held that CERCLA specifically allows the government to recover its attor-
neys' fees.55
In support of this proposition, the court relied upon sections
9607(a)(4)(A) and 9604(b). It pointed out that section 9607 (a)(4)(A)
holds responsible parties liable for all costs of removal or remedial action
and that the definition of removal includes action taken pursuant to sec-
tion 9604(b).58 Section 9604(b), in turn, provides that when the govern-
ment has taken action under section 9604(a) to respond to the release of
hazardous substances into the environment, it may undertake legal stud-
ies or investigations and recover the costs thereof.57 The court concluded
that, since the government had acted pursuant to section 9604(a), the de-
48. See supra note 12.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
50. See supra note 30.
51. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
52. Id. at 833.
53. Id. at 830.
54. Id. at 851.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 851-52.
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fendants were liable for all of the government's costs of response.58
Construed together, sections 9604(a), 9604(b), and 9607(a)(4)(A) seem
to provide a logical rationale for awarding the government its attorneys'
fees in cost-recovery actions. No court, however, has addressed the fact
that section 9604(b) merely allows the government to recover costs associ-
ated with legal studies and investigations, not legal actions.5 9 Apparently,
the courts that have permitted the government to recover its attorneys'
fees considered this difference to be insignificant.
C. Private Cost-Recovery Actions
In contrast to their holdings in government cost-recovery actions, fed-
eral courts have not been as generous in awarding attorneys' fees to pre-
vailing litigants in private cost-recovery actions.60 Some courts have held
that CERCLA contemplates a different standard of recovery for nongov-
ernmental entities.6 1 To determine whether a different standard actually
applies, one must ascertain the congressional intent behind CERCLA.62
Gleaning this intent from the legislative history proves a difficult task.
Since Congress hastily drafted CERCLA at the close of the ninety-sixth
Congress, the legislative history is almost non-existent43 The lack of leg-
islative history makes it necessary to examine closely the wording of the
statute. 4
58. Id.
59. Charles H. Tisdale, Current Issues in Superfund Litigation, in HAZARDOUS WASTE
LITGATION 1985, at 61, 86 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 283
(1985)) (stating that recovery actions should not be characterized as a legal study or
investigation).
60. See supra note 20.
61. See New York v. General Elec. Co. 592 F. Supp. 291, 298 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[Section
107(a)(4)(B)] is applicable to parties other than federal or state governments and estab-
lishes significantly different cost recovery criteria."); United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("On its face, section
107(a)(4)(B) intends that a different standard apply to cost recovery by nongovernmental
entities . ... ).
62. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that courts should be guided by congressional intent when interpreting a federal statute); cf.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (looking at what Congress indicated in a federal
statute); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (looking to the legislative scheme
of the statute).
63. Gaba, supra note 16, at 184 n.6 (citing ENvTL. L. INST., 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY xiii-xxii (1982); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 1 (1982); Robert C. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Con-
trol, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1981)).
64. See Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal.
1990) ("It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that the primary rule of
implementing legislative intent 'is to ascertain and give effect to the plain meaning of the
language used.' ")
1991] CERCLA
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
1. A Comparison of CERCLA's Two Cost-Recovery Provisions: Sections
9607(a)(4)(A) and (B)
Section 9607(a)(4), embodying CERCLA's two cost-recovery provisions,
authorizes the government and private parties to recoup their cleanup ex-
penses from responsible parties. 5 It mandates that responsible parties
shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan,
[and]
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan...e
Subsections (A) and (B) differ in three major respects. None of these dif-
ferences, however, justifies awarding attorneys' fees to the government,
but not to a private party.
First, CERCLA's two cost-recovery provisions use different language to
mandate consistency with the national contingency plan.6 7 Subsection (A)
of section 9607(a)(4) specifies that the government's costs of response
must not be inconsistent with the national contingency plan.68
In NEPACCO, the court interpreted this subsection as requiring the
defendant in a government cost-recovery action to prove that the govern-
ment incurred costs inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 9 It
construed the insertion of the word "not" immediately preceding the
word "inconsistent" to indicate that the defendants are presumed liable
for all response costs incurred by the government, unless they can present
evidence of inconsistency. 0
In contrast, subsection(B) states that a private party's costs of response
must be consistent with the national contingency plan. 71 According to the
NEPACCO court, this subsection contemplates a different standard of re-
covery for nongovernmental entities. These parties must affirmatively es-
tablish that their actions were consistent with the national contingency
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(4)(A) (1988).
69. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. ("NEPACCO"), 579 F.
Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291,
304 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the burden of proof is on the defendant to show costs
inconsistent with the national contingency plan). But see Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Mon-
santo Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (stating that the burden of proof is on
the government to show costs not inconsistent with the national contingency plan).
70. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 850.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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plan.7 2 Although this distinction places an additional burden of proof on
private plaintiffs, this burden should not preclude them from recovering
attorneys' fees as long as they can prove that these costs were incurred
consistent with the national contingency plan.
Subsections (A) and (B) also use different terms to distinguish between
the types of costs recoverable by the government and those recoverable
by private parties. The government may recover "all costs, '73 whereas
private parties may recover "any other necessary costs. '7 4 As this lan-
guage implies, private parties bear the extra burden of proving that their
costs were "necessary." CERCLA places no comparable burden on the
government. Instead, courts presume that costs incurred by the govern-
ment are reasonable and therefore recoverable.7 5
The NEPACCO court explained the rationale behind this presumption.
The court emphasized that had Congress intended for the government to
prove the necessity of its costs, Congress would have employed the phrase
"all reasonable costs" in subsection (A) instead of "all costs. '76 The fact
that courts presume that costs incurred by the government are reasona-
ble* should not prevent private parties from recovering attorneys' fees
under "all reasonable costs." Private parties must simply prove the neces-
sity of these costs.
One final difference in the language of CERCLA's cost- recovery provi-
sions is that the government may recover costs associated with "removal
and remedial action,' 77 but private parties may recover their costs of "re-
sponse. '7 8 This distinction is irrelevant since the definition of "response"
includes the terms "removal and remedial action." 9 Consequently, these
provisions authorize recovery of exactly the same expenses. Furthermore,
nothing in the definitional section of CERCLA indicates that Congress
intended to apply the definitions of removal and remedial action solely to
actions taken by the federal government.8 0
2. The Recovery of Legal Costs Pursuant to Section 9604(b)
Although there is no direct evidence that Congress meant to distinguish
72. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 850.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
74. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
75. See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851.
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
78. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
79. Id. § 9601(25).
80. See id. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B), 9601(23)-(25); see also Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spec-
trolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("IT]he definition for 'response' provided
in Section 101(25) nevertheless applies to section 107(a)(4)(B); Congress has not expressly
limited the definitions set forth in [section 9601(25)] to federal parties.")
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between costs recoverable by the government and those recoverable by
private parties, some courts still award attorney's fees only in government
cost-recovery actions.81 These courts point to the fact that CERCLA per-
mits the recovery of legal costs in a section relating to governmental ac-
tion but provides no analogous section permitting a similar recovery by
private parties.2 Section 9604(b) specifically authorizes the President to
recover the costs of whatever legal studies or investigations are necessary
to plan and direct response actions.8 3 In contrast, none of the provisions
pertaining to private parties explicitly authorizes the recovery of these
same costs.
In T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp.,8 4 the court relied heav-
ily on this dichotomy in refusing to award attorneys' fees in a private
cost-recovery action. T & E Industries ("T & E") had purchased land
contaminated with radioactive tailings, a by-product generated in radium
extraction operations.8 5 When T & E discovered the contamination, it ini-
tiated immediate corrective action. T & E then sued United States Ra-
dium Corporation and its corporate successor, Safety Light Corporation,
to recover the monies expended in cleaning the environmental damage
allegedly caused by United States Radium's hazardous dumping prac-
tices.8 The court awarded T & E certain response costs but specifically
denied T & E's claim for attorneys' fees.
8 7
The court first restated the familiar American Rule that attorneys' fees
may not be awarded to a prevailing litigant unless those costs are specifi-
cally provided for by contract or statute.8 8 The T & E court found no
specific language in CERCLA authorizing the award of attorneys' fees to
a private party.
The court did acknowledge that CERCLA contains no evidence of a
general legislative intent to distinguish between costs recoverable by gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental entities. Nevertheless, the court empha-
sized that Congress had specifically addressed legal costs in a section
dealing solely with governmental action.8 9 The court observed that sec-
tion 9604(b) provides for the recovery of the costs of legal studies and
investigations necessary to plan and direct government response actions.
But, because it found no analogous portion of the statute expressly enti-
tling a private party to recover for legal action taken, it refused to create
81. See supra note 20.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988).
83. See supra note 12.
84. 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988).
85. Id. at 698.
86. Id. at 699.
87. Id. at 707-08.
88. Id. at 707.
89. Id. at 707-08.
[Vol. 26:213
CERCLA
such a right.9 0
Certainly, Congress could have drafted a provision analogous to section
9604(b), if it had intended for private parties to recover costs associated
with legal studies and investigations. The absence of such a provision,
however, should not preclude private parties from recovering their attor-
neys' fees if other sections of CERCLA reveal with sufficient explicitness
Congress' intent to award such costs.
3. Attorneys' Fees as a Cost of Enforcement
CERCLA authorizes the recovery of costs of private enforcement activi-
ties related to removal and remedial actions. Section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows
private parties to recover their "necessary costs of response." '91 The defi-
nition of "response" includes removal and remedial action as well as "en-
forcement activities related thereto."'9 2
In order for private parties to recover their attorneys' fees as a cost of
enforcement, two conditions must be met. First, Congress must have in-
tended for the phrase "enforcement activities related thereto" to apply to
nongovernmental entities. Second, a private cost-recovery action must
qualify as an "enforcement activity" within the meaning of the statute.
a. The Applicability of CERCLA's Enforcement Language to Nongov-
ernmental Entities
The phrase "enforcement activities related thereto" was not included
in the original definition of "response."9 " Rather, it was added in 1986 by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").94 To de-
termine whether private parties may recover attorneys' fees under the ru-
bric of costs associated with the enforcement of removal and remedial
actions, it is essential to know whether Congress intended for the new
phrase to apply to nongovernmental entities. The legislative history offers
little guidance in this regard. In House Report Number 99-253(I), the
Committee on Energy and Commerce commented that "[t]he change [in
the definition of response] will confirm the EPA's authority to recover
90. Id. Other courts have followed the reasoning of T & E in not allowing private parties
to recover attorneys' fees. E.g., United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D.
Okla. 1990); see also Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (D.N.H. 1990); BCW
Assocs., Ltd. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 86 Civ. 5947, slip op. at 34, 40, 58 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 29, 1988).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1985).
92. Id. § 9601(25) (emphasis added).
93. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act ("CER-
CLA"), Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 101(25), 94 Stat. 2767, 2771 (1980).
94. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, Sec.
101(e), 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1613, 1615 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988)).
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costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible parties. '9 5
This wording was strictly construed against private parties in Fal-
lowfield v. Strunk.9 6 In that case, private parties brought a claim for re-
sponse costs against a couple from whom they had bought a piece of
property contaminated with hazardous waste. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees.97 After examining the legislative his-
tory of the SARA amendments, the court concluded that Congress had
not intended for private parties to collect attorneys' fees in cost-recovery
actions. 8 The court emphasized that the House Report confirmed only
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s authority to recover costs
for enforcement actions taken against responsible parties.99 Consequently,
it concluded that Congress, by expanding the definition of "response" to
include "enforcement activities" did not intend to allow private parties to
collect attorneys' fees in private cost-recovery actions. 10 The court con-
strued the committee's reference solely to the EPA's authority to recover
enforcement costs as thereby creating a negative implication that private
parties may not recover such costs.1"'
Although the Fallowfield court's strict interpretation of SARA's legisla-
tive history seems logical, Congress did not amend the definition of "re-
sponse" specifically to exclude the definition's application to private par-
ties. Instead, the definition of "response" allows for the recovery of costs
related to the enforcement of removal and remedial actions without dif-
ferentiating between costs recoverable by the government and those re-
coverable by private parties. 102 According to the plain language of the
statute, therefore, Congress did not intend for the EPA alone to recover
its enforcement costs.
This latter interpretation of section 9601(25) was adopted by the court
in Pease & Curren Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc. 03 In that case, a
company which extracts and refines precious metals from chemical waste
brought suit against one of its waste suppliers. The supplier had provided
the company with a contaminated waste product that caused an explosion
on the company's premises. The court awarded the company its attor-
neys' fees as a cost of response. 04
95. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Congress, 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 66-67 (1985), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N., 2835, 2848-49.
96. No. 89 Civ. 8644, slip op. at 16 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990); reconsideration denied, 766
F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988).
103. 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
104. Id. at 951-52.
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The Pease & Curren court strongly questioned the notion that Con-
gress had intended to allow only the federal government to claim attor-
neys' fees under the rubric of "enforcement activities." The court noted
that the definition of "response" provided in section 9601(25) also applies
to section 9607(a)(4)(B) and that Congress expressly did not restrict ap-
plication of the definitions set forth in section 9601(25) solely to federal
parties."0 5 The court held that it was bound by the plain language of the
text and could not take it upon itself to limit the statute's application. 106
b. Private Cost-Recovery Actions as Enforcement Actions
The language of CERCLA and its case history indicate that the phrase
"enforcement activities related thereto" should apply to nongovernmental
entities. But courts are divided on the issue of whether private cost-recov-
ery actions constitute "enforcement activities."'0 7 Because CERCLA does
not define the term "enforcement," courts have had to formulate their
own definition of the phrase.
In T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp.*, the court ruled that
private cost-recovery actions are not enforcement activities. 08 It recog-
nized that, although plaintiffs may bring actions to recover their response
costs, they may not bring actions against another private entity to enforce
CERCLA's cleanup provisions. Consequently, the court concluded that
private parties do not incur "enforcement costs" as contemplated by
CERCLA. 0 9
To test the validity of this theory, it is useful to compare section
9607(a)(4)(B), CERCLA's private cost-recovery provision, with another
CERCLA provision that clearly authorizes private enforcement. Section
9659, CERCLA's citizens' suit provision, allows private parties to bring
actions to enforce the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 1 0 Specifically, it
provides that a party may commence a civil action against another party
"alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, [or] re-
quirement" of CERCLA."' In such suits, federal district courts have ju-
105. Id. at 951.
106. Id.
107. For cases holding that private cost recovery actions are enforcement activities, see
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d at 1422; Gopher Oil Co. v.
Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. at 1006-07; Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F.
Supp. at 951-52; Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see T
& E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding private
parties do not incur enforcement costs in CERCLA actions).
108. 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13.
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
111. Id. § 9659(a)(1). Subsection (a)(1) specifically provides:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf:
(1) against any person (including the United States and any other governmental
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risdiction to order whatever action is necessary to correct the violation
and to impose civil penalties on violators." 2 Since people who file citi-
zens' suits do not undertake cleanup, section 9659 does not provide a
right of action for response costs.'1 This is the main difference between
sections 9607(a)(4)(A) and 9659.
These two sections do, however, serve a similar purpose. The goal of
CERCLA's citizens' suit provision is "to goad stricter compliance with,
and enforcement of, hazardous waste laws.""" Private cost-recovery ac-
tions accomplish the same purpose. By holding responsible parties liable
for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste, section 9607(a)(4)(B) does
not simply encourage compliance with CERCLA's hazardous waste laws,
it mandates it. In addition, section 9659 authorizes the award of attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party in a citizens' suit."5 Certainly, Congress
could not have intended to grant private parties their attorneys' fees in
citizens' suits, but deny recovery of those same costs when the parties
actually finance the cleanup of a hazardous waste site!
The view that private cost-recovery actions are not enforcement ac-
tions"16 has not been uniformly accepted. For example, in Pease & Curren
Refining, Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 17 the court relied on the "plain mean-
ing" of the phrase "enforcement activities" and determined that it en-
compasses all actions taken to induce a responsible party to comply with
the remedial actions mandated by CERCLA. It held that private cost-
recovery actions are necessarily "enforcement activities," because they ac-
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, con-
dition, requirement, or order which has become effective pursuant to this
chapter....
Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c). Subsection (c) provides inpertinent part:
The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under subsection (a)(1) of
this section to enforce the standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order con-
cerned (including any provision of an agreement under section 9620 of this title), to
order such action as may be necessary to correct the violation, and to impose any civil
penalty provided for the violation.
Id.
113. Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. at 148-50.
114. Id. at 148. ("Both the statutory language and legislative history of [section 9659] as
well as an examination of other CERCLA provisions demonstrates [sic] that [section 9659]
was merely intended to goad stricter compliance with, and enforcement of, hazardous waste
laws").
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1988). Subsection (f) provides that "[t]he court, in issuing any
final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or the substantially
prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." Id.
116. See cases cited supra note 90.
117. 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
complish this objective.118 The court could not ascertain any other logical
interpretation that would give effect to the phrase, without rendering the
phrase superfluous. 1 9
This latter interpretation of the phrase "enforcement activities" repre-
sents the better reasoned view because it furthers the two main purposes
of CERCLA: the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and the impo-
sition of all cleanup costs placed on responsible parties. 120 When Congress
provided private parties with a federal cause of action for the recovery of
their response costs, it intended that these parties initially would expend
their own funds without waiting for the responsible persons to take ac-
tion.1 21 Congress' goal of encouraging prompt action would be defeated,
however, if private parties were required to shoulder the financial burden
of the litigation necessary to recover such costs.
1 22
4. The Strict Interpretation of SARA
The decision in Regan v. Cherry Corp. 23 underscores the division
among the federal courts over the proper construction of section
9607(a)(4)(B). The Regan court strictly interpreted SARA as prohibiting
the recovery of attorneys' fees in private cost-recovery actions.
In Regan, property owners had sued several electrical products corpora-
tions and their predecessors in interest to recover the costs of cleaning up
improperly disposed hazardous waste. The court stated that "[i]f Con-
gress had intended to permit citizens seeking response costs to recover
attorneys' fees, it simply would have amended [section 9607] to allow the
recovery of these litigation costs.' 24 The court emphasized that because
SARA represented a comprehensive overhaul of CERCLA, Congress
could easily have amended section 9607 to allow the recovery of attor-
neys' fees.1
25
The logic of this argument has some appeal. Congress had the opportu-
nity to draft a provision allowing for the recovery of attorneys' fees when
it enacted SARA. But the case law on this issue was not particularly well
118. Id. at 951.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 2.
121. See Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp 692, 710 (D. Kans. 1991) (citing Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1989)); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of
New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1288 (D. Del. 1987), afl'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3rd Cir.
1988); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Pinole
Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311-14 (N.D. Ohio 1983)).
122. See cases cited supra note 121.
123. 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989).
124. Id. at 149.
125. Id.
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developed before SARA. As a result, Congress may not have anticipated
that the courts would interpret CERCLA as disallowing private parties
from recovering attorneys' fees.128 In fact, most of the cases that have
addressed the recovery of attorneys' fees in private cost-recovery actions
were decided after 1986, the year in which SARA was enacted.'
IV. THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COST-RECOVERY ACTIONS AND REQUESTS
FOR ATTORNEYs' FEES
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the environmental damage
caused by abandoned hazardous waste sites. The EPA has estimated that
there are about 27,000 sites contaminated with hazardous waste, but a
congressional report puts the figure at 130,340.128 In addition, the Office
of Technology Assessment has estimated that it will cost $100 billion and
take 50 years to clean up these sites. 2 9 A report for the insurance indus-
try, however, places this cost at $700 billion."' Even the best estimates
reveal a staggering problem that will take years and a fortune to rectify.
It is especially important, therefore, that courts tailor their remedies to
promote the most expedient, efficient cleanup of hazardous waste.
If courts refuse to allow private parties to recover their attorneys' fees
as a cost of response, they will remove a powerful incentive for private
parties to initiate response actions. Fewer parties will undertake cleanup
activities if they know that they will be required to pay the costs of the
litigation necessary to recover their expenses.'3 ' An examination of the
current decisions in private cost-recovery actions indicates that courts are
aware of this fact. Of the five most recent decisions, four have awarded
attorneys' fees to private parties as a necessary cost of response. 3'
V. CONCLUSION
Abandoned hazardous waste sites pose a serious threat to the public
health and the environment. In order to accomplish the prompt, effective
cleanup of these sites, courts must come to a consensus on disputed issues
pertaining to the cleanup of such sites. One such issue concerns the right
126. Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1006.5 (D. Minn. 1991) (citing
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 n.10 (8th Cir.
1990)).
127. See supra note 20.
128. FREDERICK ANDERSON. ET AL., Environmental Protection:
Law and Policy 614 (2d ed. 1990) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND, ExTENT
OF NATION'S PROBLEM STILL UNKNOWN (1988)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Dimond, The $700 Billion Cleaning Bill, INS. REV., Jan. 1989, at 30).
131. See Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D.C. Cal.
1990).
132. See supra note 20.
232 [Vol. 26:213
1991] CERCLA 233
of private parties to recover their attorneys' fees as a necessary cost of
response in private cost-recovery actions. This Note asserts that there is
nothing in CERCLA or in its legislative history that justifies awarding
such costs to the government, but not to private parties. CERCLA's stat-
utory language does not provide specifically for the recovery of attorneys'
fees by private parties. But Congress did indicate with sufficient explicit-
ness its intent for private parties to recover this expense as a cost associ-
ated with the enforcement of removal and remedial actions. This inter-
pretation furthers CERCLA's purposes of effecting the prompt cleanup of
hazardous wastes and imposing cleanup costs on responsible parties.
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